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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. ALLAN 
Defendant/Appellant 
) Case No. 960512-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Officer 
Moore had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of defendant 
Michael R. Allan's vehicle? 
There are two standards of review, one to the factual 
findings and the other to the conclusions of law. "The trial 
court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress are examined for clear error." State v. 
Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 76 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). " [T]he standard of review to 
be applied to the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the facts as 
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found give rise to reasonable suspicion "is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness . . . . '" Id. (quoting Pena, 869 
P.2d at 939). "Nevertheless, the nature of this particular 
determination of law allows the trial court "a measure of 
discretion . . . when applying the standard to a given set of 
facts.'" Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Michael R. Allan was arrested March 27, 1995, and 
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44, a Class B misdemeanor. 
Defendant challenged the legality of the police officer's stop of 
his vehicle, claiming that it constituted an unlawful search and 
seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution in that the investigatory stop of his vehicle 
was not supported by "reasonable suspicion." On February 15, 
1996, a Suppression Hearing was conducted before the Honorable 
Ray M. Harding, Jr. Judge Harding denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. On May 28, 1996, in a bench trial before Judge 
Harding, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. 
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Defendant was sentenced July 15, 1996, and on July 29, 1996, 
defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On March 13, 1995, at approximately 7:20 P.m.. Provo City 
Police Officer Brian Moore was on routine patrol in the downtown 
area of Provo (R. 102). At that time he was dispatched to a 
suspicious call in the Albertson's parking lot (Id.). Officer 
Moore was within four blocks of Albertson's and responded to the 
call in close to a minute's time (R. 101). Dispatch indicated to 
Officer Moore that someone on the pay phone at Albertson's was 
"indicating that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and 
they were concerned they were going to drive." (Id.) The 
informant had told dispatch that the suspect was "impaired 
walking." (R. 95) Such information was relayed to Officer Moore 
(Id.). 
When Officer Moore arrived at the parking lot, the 
individual was still on the pay phone with dispatch (Id.). The 
individual got the officer's attention by waving his hands and 
pointing (Id). As Officer Moore approached the informant, the 
informant hung up the phone and came over towards the vehicle 
(Id.). He pointed, indicating that there was an individual 
walking that had just gotten out of a red Camero and was 
returning to the red Camero (R. 100-101). The informant believed 
that the man was intoxicated (R. 100). Officer Moore saw the red 
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Camero, it was the only one in the parking lot (id.) . His 
attention was drawn to the vehicle and he felt "like it was 
extremely important to investigate instead of talking with the 
individual any longer." (Id.) After talking with the officer, 
the informant turned around and headed into Albertson's (id.). 
According to Officer Moore, "the parking lot was really 
congested with people." (R. 99) The congestion forced Officer 
Moore "to go ahead and to drive back around through the parking 
lot in order to come up with this vehicle, because it was about 
four or five cars back." (id.) From the location of his police 
car, the officer could not back up because of other vehicles 
(id.). At this point, when Officer Moore was close to 
defendant's vehicle, he initiated a stop of the vehicle. He 
stated that he "had reasonable suspicion to believe that there 
was possibly an intoxicated person there." (id.) The vehicle 
had just started to back out of a parking stall when Officer 
Moore operated his overhead lights to detain the vehicle (id.). 
Officer Moore approached the vehicle and from the plain 
smell of alcohol about the person of the driver was justified to 
continue investigating and subsequently had probable cause to 
arrest the driver for driving under the influence. The driver 
was identified as defendant Michael R. Allan. Subsequent testing 
confirmed defendant's blood alcohol level to be above that 
allowed by law for an operator of a vehicle. 
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SUMMARY OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
In the case Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
(Utah App. 1997) that the Utah Court of Appeals handed down after 
the filing of the briefs in the case at bar, this Court found 
reasonable suspicion existed for an officer to stop a drunk 
driver based on information provided by a citizen-informant. 
Further, this Court in Mulcahy outlined steps for determining 
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for making an 
investigatory stop for drunk driving when the information is 
provided by an informant. 
Mulcahy is controlling in the case at bar. This Court found 
in that case that if an officer confirms facts given by an 
informant, the officer does not have to wait until the suspect 
endangers the public by actually driving before the officer may 
make an investigatory stop 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE ARGUMENT ALREADY PRESENTED 
MULCAHY IS CONTROLLING IN THE CASE AT BAR AND AS 
APPLIED BY THIS COURT OFFICER MOORE HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
Since the filing of Appellee's brief in the matter of Provo 
City Corporation v. Michael R. AllanA 960512-CA (1997), a 
decision from the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has come 
down and is on point with respect to the facts and issues at bar. 
In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 
1997) the appellate court decided, inter alia, that a police 
officer may rely on information from a dispatcher which was 
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obtained from a citizen informant to make a stop. 
The Court of Appeals held that reasonable suspicion exists, 
thereby justifying a stop, when an officer receives information 
which is corroborated by the officer. The Court in Mulcahy 
articulated a three step process for determining articulable 
suspicion. The first step is to determine the type of the tip 
involved. The Court quoted State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ""[N]ot all tips are of equal value in 
establishing reasonable suspicion.1" The Court noted that 
anonymous tips are toward the "low-end of the reliability scale." 
Id. An anonymous tip, however, does not prevent a reasonable 
officer from making a stop based on the tip. 
The second step the Court identified is whether the 
informant "gave enough detail about the observed criminal 
activity to support a stop." Id. The Court of Appeals stated, 
"A tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant 
observed the details personally, instead of simply relying on 
information from a third party." Xd. Giving an example from 
Roth to illustrate this point the Court of Appeals said "For 
instance, the informant in Roth gave enough detail in reporting 
"the existence of a drunk driver along with a description of the 
driver's vehicle, license number, and location.'" Id, 
The final step which the Court identified is "whether the 
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's 
report of the informant's tip." id. The Court stated that ""The 
officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal 
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activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the location 
substantially as described by the informant." Mulcahy (quoting 
from State v. Bybee, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
In a situation that involves a potential drunk driver the 
Court of Appeals specifically stated that "Certainly, "officers 
are encouraged to investigate the suspect immediately, rather 
than to allow the suspect to drive so that the officer may 
observe the driving. Otherwise, the risk that the suspect will 
be involved in an accident increases, which is not in the 
public's interest.'" Id. (quoting from Playle v. Commissioner of 
Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)). 
The Mulcahy case in controlling in the case at bar. In 
Allan the defendant was observed by a citizen who called police 
dispatch with information that the defendant's walking was 
impaired, appeared to be drunk and was preparing to get into his 
car. A police officer was less than a minute away from the scene 
and upon arriving the informant, who was still on the phone with 
dispatch at this time, physically pointed to the defendant and 
his red Camero. Although dispatch and the police officer were 
unable to locate the informant after the officer initiated the 
stop, the fact that the informant sufficiently described the 
defendant and his vehicle by physically pointing them out to the 
police officer satisfies the requirements set forth in Mulcahy 
for reasonable suspicion. Further, in accordance with Mulcahy 
the police officer was not required to wait until the defendant 
posed a public danger by allowing him to operate his vehicle 
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before initiating a stop. The information received from dispatch 
regarding a person who was apparently inebriated was subsequently 
confirmed by the informant identifying the suspect. This, 
coupled with the public's interest in not having a potentially 
drunk driver on the streets, gave the officer the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful stop which led to the 
arrest of the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the argument above, Officer Moore's investigative 
stop of defendant Michael R. Allan's vehicle was supported and 
justified by reasonable suspicion based on specific and 
articulable facts. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and uphold 
defendant's conviction for Driving Under the Influence. 
Dated this ^' day of August, 1997. 
l/C^^yu^^^ <tZ 
VERNON F. ROMNEY 
Attorney for Plaiihtdff-Appellee 
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